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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Gerst argued the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion in limine in part and held that his 2007 DUI conviction could be used to
enhance his subsequent conviction. Specifically, he argued that the record in the 2007 case did
not show that his waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and intelligent. The State argues in
response that the language of the waiver provision, and the checked boxes on the judgment,
show Mr. Gerst knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. This reply brief is
necessary to address that argument.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Gerst’s appellant’s brief. They need not be repeated in this reply brief, but are incorporated
herein by reference.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Gerst’s motion in limine as to the
enhancement issue?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Gerst’s Motion In Limine As To
The Enhancement Issue
In ruling on Mr. Gerst’s motion in limine, the district court found there was nothing in the
record from the 2007 case to explain why Mr. Gerst had waived his right to counsel. (R., p.122.)
In fact, the court even wrote that this was “somewhat troubling, as [was] the absence of
indication that the magistrate took steps to satisfy himself that the waiver was knowing and
voluntary.” (R., p.122.) But, instead of presuming the waiver was not knowing and voluntary
because there was no record the magistrate took such steps, the district court ruled that the 2007
conviction could be used for enhancement purposes. (R., pp.122-23.) Its reasoning was that no
Faretta1 inquiry is necessary when a defendant pleads guilty to a misdemeanor. (R., p.122.)
However, as explained in the appellant’s brief, there is a distinction between a full Faretta
inquiry and some basic colloquy to ensure that a waiver is knowing and intelligent (App.
Br., pp.12-13); here, some kind of colloquy was required to ensure Mr. Gerst knew he had a right
to appointed counsel in the 2007 case and to ensure he actually understood the language of the
waiver.
The State provides no response to this argument, instead characterizing the problem in
this case as a “last-ditch claim” disproved by the waiver provision. (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.) This
does not address the issue. Indeed, the language of the waiver did not allay the district court’s
concern about whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent. (R., p.122.) Neither did the
checked boxes on the judgment, one of which was actually checked in error. (R., p.122, n.1.)
What did allay its concern was its recognition that a full Faretta inquiry is not necessary when a

1

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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defendant waives the right to counsel and pleads guilty to a misdemeanor. (R., p.122.) While
that is a correct statement of the rule, that rule does not solve the problem of whether the
magistrate ever established that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. As the district court
recognized, the record here is silent as to why Mr. Gerst waived his right to counsel, and it is also
silent as to whether the magistrate court in the 2007 case confirmed that Mr. Gerst’s waiver was
knowing and voluntary. (R., p.122.)
The State takes exception with the fact that Mr. Gerst omitted the word “reasonable”
when addressing the rule that courts are required to “indulge in every reasonable presumption
against waiver.” (Resp. Br., pp.8-9.) This is a red herring; adding “reasonable” does not change
the analysis. In fact, Mr. Gerst agrees that it “would be entirely unreasonable for the district
court to presume there was no waiver here . . . .” (Resp. Br., p.9.) But that is not what the
district court did. The district court presumed the waiver was knowing and intelligent when
there was no indication the magistrate took steps to confirm that Mr. Gerst knew what the
language in the waiver provision meant or knew he had a right to appointed counsel.
This was unreasonable for several reasons. First, there was no audio recording of the
alleged pre-trial conference at which Mr. Gerst signed the pre-trial stipulation, but there were
audio recordings of the other hearings. (R., p.122, n.2; pp.73-74.) The district court stated, “For
whatever reason, no audio recording of that proceeding was submitted for the Court’s review.”
(R., p.122, n.2.) Given the fact the other audio recordings were disclosed by the State in
response to the motion in limine (R., p.73, n.3), it would have been reasonable to presume that an
audio recording of the “pre-trial conference” did not exist because the conference did not take
place in front of a magistrate judge. Second, Mr. Gerst testified that he did not know an attorney
could be appointed for him. (7/31/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-17.) And third, unlike in State v. Farfan-
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Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, 611 (2016), there is no indication here that Mr. Gerst was ever provided
with a document advising him of his rights before he signed the pre-trial stipulation.
Therefore, while the district court came close to reasonably presuming the waiver was not
valid because it was not knowing and intelligent (R., p.122), it ultimately unreasonably
presumed that “perhaps” Mr. Gerst was informed about his rights—“Perhaps the magistrate took
such steps during the pretrial conference on November 27, 2007, when Gerst signed the waiver
of his right to counsel.”

(R., p.122, n.2.)

The rule requires courts “to indulge in every

reasonable presumption against waiver,” not to indulge in guesswork in favor of them. Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). The court also failed to recognize that, even though a
Faretta hearing was not necessary, the record needed to contain something more than checked
boxes and pre-printed text to show that Mr. Gerst’s waiver was knowing and intelligent.
The State’s arguments skirt the thorny issue here in favor of a blithe reliance on the
language of the waiver and the checked boxes in the judgment. (Resp. Br., pp.7-10.) However,
the district court itself did not find that those documents showed Mr. Gerst’s waiver was
knowing and intelligent.

Even after reading those, it was troubled by the absence of any

indication that the “magistrate took steps to satisfy himself that the waiver was knowing and
voluntary.” (R., p.122.) Instead of presuming that “perhaps” Mr. Gerst was informed about his
rights, the district court should have presumed that did not happen, and thus held that the State
failed to prove the waiver was valid. This would have been consistent with indulging in every
reasonable presumption against waiver. Without any record that Mr. Gerst understood what the
waiver provision meant, it was necessary for the district court to presume the waiver was not
knowing and intelligent and therefore not valid. Instead, it presumed the waiver was valid.
Thus, it abused its discretion because it failed to apply the applicable legal standards.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Gerst respectfully requests that this Court: (1) hold that his 2007 misdemeanor
conviction was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and, therefore,
cannot be used to enhance any subsequent offenses; (2) vacate Mr. Gerst’s conviction and
sentence in this case; (3) reverse the district court’s order on Mr. Gerst’s motion in limine; and
(4) remand this case to the district court with an order that Mr. Gerst be allowed to withdraw his
guilty plea, and that the felony enhancement be stricken, and the DUI charge reduced to a
misdemeanor.
DATED this 22nd day of October, 2018.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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